Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill Art 5F Kenya 2008

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (TJRC) was established in 2008. Republic of kenya's modern history has been marked not merely by liberation struggles but besides past indigenous conflicts, semi-despotic regimes, marginalization and political violence, including the coup d'état of 1982, the Shifta War, and the 2007 Post-election violence.[1]

The toll of the 2007 Mail service-election violence included approximately 1,500 deaths, iii,000 rapes, and 300,000 people left internally displaced. The virtually astringent episode of this disharmonize unfolded over 59 days betwixt Election Day, 27 December 2007 and 28 February 2008. A political compromise was reached that saw the two alien parties sign a National Accord, post-obit the mediation efforts past the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan.[2]

Background [edit]

Despite the reputation of the Rift valley equally the cradle of humanity and positive co-beingness, the peoples living in that location suffered through mass man rights violations in the later part of the 20th century. The mass violence in Republic of kenya occurred throughout a menstruum of over 40 years making it difficult to define concretely as post-election violence. To empathize the events following the 1992 and 2007 elections in Kenya, ane must get-go empathise the complicated ethnic makeup of the Kenyan state. The ii tribes primarily involved in the political violence are the Kikuyu people (22 percent of the 2008 Kenyan population) and the Kalenjin people (12 percent of the 2008 Kenyan population), nevertheless many other smaller tribes also inhabit Kenya. These indigenous tensions originate in events occurring before independence when British colonists forced the Kalenjin pastoral tribe off their land to develop the Rift Valley agriculturally. With the colonists came Kikuyu farmers to work equally sharecroppers in the British fields. Continued competition for economic wealth and ability also drove the two tribes apart.

Later when selecting government officials after independence in 1963, the tension between these ii tribes increased equally, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, became president and Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, became vice-president. After Kenyatta's expiry, Moi took power and tightened his concur on Kenya through censoring and human rights violations. In 1991 a constitutional reform passed allowing for multipartyism in Kenya. Shortly after in 1992 the outset multi-party election since independence took place. Moi won the elections just many doubted the legitimacy of his victory. Violence ensued equally Kalenjin supporters of Moi raped, killed, and displaced Kikuyu opposition supporters. Despite Kalenjin attacks on Kikuyu making upwards the majority of the ethnic violence in Kenya, ethnic conflicts between tribes remained much more than complicated. This violence persisted long after the 1992 election with postelection violence reports in 1998, 2002, and 2007. Similar to the 1992 election, in Dec 2007 incumbent president Mwai Kibaki won an election called "deeply flawed" past observers.[3] The Kalenjin, who supported the opposition leader Raila Odinga, burned down the houses and hacked to death Kikuyus who supported Mr. Kibaki. Weeks afterwards the ballot, Kikuyus violently took revenge forcing other ethnic groups out of Kikuyu dominated areas. This postal service election violence took the lives of over 800 people and displaced at least 300,000.[3] [4] [5]

1992 Postal service-election violence [edit]

President Daniel Arap Moi in 1979

The 1992 multiparty General Elections were riddled with irregularities with some opposition candidates even being physically prevented from presenting their nomination papers. The incumbent, then President Daniel Arap Moi, entrada freely all over the country while other party leaders could not. Where the opposition could not campaign freely, President Moi traversed the state using government resources. Moreover, he enjoyed a monopoly of media coverage from the official broadcaster, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC). In add-on, the Balloter Commission was made up of presidential appointees whose loyalty to the incumbent was never in doubt. The most notorious instance of interference with the electoral process was the 1988 General Elections where many losing candidates were declared winners. The then sole ruling party, KANU, had already secured the monopoly for political ability through a constitutional subpoena in 1982 that made it the sole political party. In the 1991 clashes, not-Kalenjin and not-Maasai ethnic groups were "attacked, their houses fix on fire, their backdrop looted and in sure instances, some of them were killed or severely injured with traditional weapons like bows and arrows, spears, pangas, swords and clubs." In its investigations, witnesses told the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, (KNCHR), that vehement clashes between the Kalenjin, on the ane hand, and the Kikuyu and Kisii on the other, began in 1992. These clashes pitted these groups along indigenous lines besides equally on political lines. In 1992, the Kalenjin were overwhelmingly members of the so ruling political party, the Kenya African National Matrimony, (KANU). President Daniel Arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin community, was the President of KANU and the country. He was opposed to the introduction of multi-political party politics in the country and the existence of opposition political parties especially in the Rift Valley. Many not-Kalenjin and non-Maasai communities in the Rift Valley supported the then budding opposition parties. The Akiwumi report on the 1992 clashes reported that the provincial administration was partisan in its support of the then KANU government and against those considered to be opposed to KANU in the Rift Valley. In 1992 the provincial administration as well showed open partisanship in favour of KANU.[half-dozen]

1997 Postal service-election violence [edit]

In December 1997, Kenyans went to the polls to elect members of parliament and the land'southward president. The elections were conducted in the glare of international publicity, not least because the international community was seriously concerned about whether the elections would be free and fair. Despite evidence of electoral irregularities, political violence and a legal framework which favoured the incumbent government, observers of the elections endorsed the resulting victory of President Moi and the Republic of kenya African National Spousal relationship (KANU) equally being an expression of the volition of the people.

In the wake of the elections, there chop-chop followed a waning of international involvement in political developments in Kenya. This was despite the fact that inside a month of the elections, politically motivated ethnic 'clashes' erupted in Rift Valley Province. The violence left hundreds of people dead or injured, and thousands of others displaced from their homes and living in makeshift shelters. It was clear that this violence was post-obit a blueprint similar to that encountered during previous outbreaks of conflict in Kenya between 1991 and 1994 – prior to and after the country'south kickoff multi-party elections in 1992— in which predominantly Kalenjin supporters of KANU attacked members of ostensibly 'pro-opposition' ethnic groups. The important difference betwixt then and now was that for the beginning time, members of a 'pro-opposition' ethnic grouping, the Kikuyus, were organising and actively fighting back.

Although the 1997 elections passed off with less violence than had been the instance in 1992, events in Jan 1998 put paid to whatever hopes that political violence might be a thing of the past in Kenya. On the nighttime of 11 January 1998, some members of the Pokot and Samburu ethnic groups raided the habitation of a Kikuyu widow at a place called Mirgwit in the Laikipia District of the Rift Valley Province. The raiders raped the adult female and stole some livestock from the household. A group of Kikuyu men followed the raiders but, having failed to catch up with them, entered a Samburu compound where, in retaliation, they mutilated livestock that they found at that place. Mutilation of livestock is highly taboo for pastoralists such as the Samburu and Pokot. Accordingly, it was almost inevitable that in that location would be some kind of response by the owners of the livestock.

On the nighttime of 13 January 1998, some Pokot and Samburu men attacked Kikuyu communities in the Magande, Survey, Motala, Milimani and Mirgwit areas of Ol Moran in Laikipia. Information technology appears that the attackers were armed not only with spears, bows and arrows, but likewise with guns. Information technology was claimed that some of the attackers were dressed in military-type clothing. Information technology has been estimated that over fifty Kikuyus were killed during these attacks and over m others fled the expanse and sought refuge at the Roman Catholic Church at Kinamba, from where they were later relocated to temporary shelters at Sipili and Ol Moran. On 21 January, about 70 unidentified people invaded three farms in Njoro including i belonging to the newly elected DP Member of Parliament for Molo Constituency, Kihika Kimani. Iii days later, groups of what local residents described as Kalenjins attacked Kikuyus in parts of Njoro in the aforementioned constituency. There were varying explanations given for these attacks. One version of events blamed them on the refusal of local Kikuyu traders to supply appurtenances and services to Kalenjins in response to the events in Laikipia. Another suggested that this was simply an unprovoked attack on Kikuyus by local Kalenjin youths. The set on on Kikuyus on 24 January provoked a counter-attack by a group of apparently wellorganised Kikuyus, who on 25 January attacked Kalenjin residents of Naishi/Lare in Njoro.

According to police reports, 34 Kikuyus and 48 Kalenjins were killed during these initial attacks and over 200 houses were burnt down. Hundreds of people from both communities were displaced by the fighting, and many of them fled to temporary 'camps' at Kigonor, Sururu, Larmudiac mission and Mauche. During its visit to Kenya the joint mission witnessed the very poor conditions in which displaced people in these camps were living. Desultory fighting continued during February and March 1998. By 11 March, police force reports were estimating that at to the lowest degree 127 people had been killed since the 'clashes' had begun in January.[seven] [8]

2007 Post-ballot violence [edit]

Whereas betwixt 1992 and 2002 most election related violence occurred during the pre-election stage at the time of voter registration, party campaigns and nominations, the 2007 elections were characterised by excessive violence, and crimes against humanity, especially after the announcement of Mwai Kibaki of the Political party of National Unity (PNU) as president in the contested results. The 2007–08 mail-election violence shook the nation considering of its spread, speed and ruthlessness. The closely contested presidential ballot was characterised by unrealistic promises, fragmentation, balkanisation, media hype and stiff expressions of ethnic nationalism. Inspired and propelled past the rejection of the 2005 Referendum on a authorities sponsored constitution, the principal opposition party went full throttle to wrest ability grade the incumbent in the full general elections.[9]

The 2007–2008 Kenyan crisis refers to a political, economic, and humanitarian crisis that erupted in Republic of kenya afterward incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential ballot held on 27 December 2007. Supporters of Kibaki'southward opponent, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement, alleged balloter manipulation. This was widely confirmed past international observers, perpetrated past both parties in the election.[x] [11]

In part due to the ethnic and geographic multifariousness of the ODM coalition, no one narrative can explain the reaction of opposition supporters to the declaration of Kibaki's swearing-in. In improver to staging several nonviolent protests, opposition supporters went on a violent binge in several parts of the country, most noticeably in Odinga's homeland of Nyanza Province and the slums of Nairobi, part of his Langata constituency. Police shot a number of demonstrators, including a few in front of Television set news cameras, causing more violence directed toward the police.[12]

Targeted ethnic violence (as opposed to violent protests) escalated and at first was directed mainly against Kikuyu people – the customs of which Kibaki is a member – living outside their traditional settlement areas, especially in the Rift Valley Province. This violence peaked with the killing of over 30 unarmed civilians in a church almost Eldoret on New Years Day. Tensions in the Rift Valley have caused violence in several previous Kenyan elections, most notably in the 1992 Kenyan Elections. Some of the Kikuyu too engaged in retaliatory violence against groups supportive of Odinga, primarily Luos and Kalenjin, especially in the areas surrounding Nakuru and Naivasha.

In Mombasa, Muslim Kenyans took to the streets to protest the electoral manipulations and air their own grievances, though ethnic tensions played much less of a role in these protests. Looters as well struck a number of stores in Mombasa. The slums of Nairobi saw some of the worst violence, some of this ethnically motivated attacks, some elementary outrage at extreme poverty, and some the deportment of criminal gangs. The violence connected sporadically for several months, particularly in the Rift Valley.

Erstwhile United nations Secretary General Kofi Annan arrived in the country almost a calendar month after the ballot, and successfully brought the two sides to the negotiating table. On 28 February 2008, Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement called the National Accordance and Reconciliation Act, which establishes the part of prime minister and creates a coalition government.[ane] The power-sharing Cabinet, headed past Odinga as Prime Government minister, was somewhen named on 13 Apr, after lengthy negotiations over its limerick;[13] information technology was sworn in on 17 Apr.[xiv]

The National Accord [edit]

The ii parties agreed to tackle iv primary agenda items to end the political crunch and address its underlying causes.

  • Agenda Item 1: Immediate Activeness to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights.
  • Calendar Item two: Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis, and Promoting Healing and Reconciliation.
  • Calendar Item three: How to Overcome the Political Crunch (power sharing).
  • Agenda Item iv: Tackling Long-term Bug.

The TJRC [edit]

The TJRC (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Committee of Kenya) is part of the accountability component of Agenda Four of the National Accord signed in 2008. By addressing the cause and effects of historical injustices and gross violations of human rights the TJRC will contribute towards national unity, reconciliation, and healing. The Commission is established past an Act of Parliament (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Human activity no. 6 of 2008) to investigate the gross human rights violations and other historical injustices in Kenya between 12 December 1963 and 28 Feb 2008.

Agenda Four of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation process of 2008 that relates to long term problems and reforms provides the framework for transitional justice, with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission driving the transitional justice agenda.

Kenya'southward civil social club have called for a truth, justice, and reconciliation procedure since 2002 when the NARC Authorities came into ability after the twenty 4-twelvemonth rule of President Moi. In 2003, a Authorities appointed Task Strength recommended establishment of a Truth Justice and reconciliation Commission. Had this recommendation been acted on then, perhaps the country might have avoided the mail service Dec 2007 ballot violence witnessed.[6]

Mandate of the TJRC [edit]

The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya has the ability to investigate, analyse, and written report on what happened between 1963 and 2008 in regards to gross violations of homo rights, economical crimes, illegal acquisition of public land, marginalisation of communities, ethnic violence, the context in which the crimes occurred, and brainwash the public about its work. The TJRC does non, however, have the power to prosecute. They can recommend prosecutions, reparations for victims, institutional changes, and amnesty in exchange for truth for perpetrators who did not commit gross human being rights violations.

The TJRC investigates, analyses, and reports on homo rights abuses, economic crimes, illegal acquisition of land, marginalisation of communities, and ethnic violence. In terms of justice, lack of retributive justice has been a source of concern for many Kenyans. Though the commission can recommend prosecutions, there has been a long-standing culture of impunity in the country, which threatens to keep political leaders safe from prosecution. Even so, the commission has focused on justice in terms of recognition and distribution. The commission has sought to give victims and perpetrators equal vocalism in hearings, and have included hearings where children may share their stories, with guidance from counselors. Recommendations for redistribution of ability and resources has been a focus of the mandate, equally major conflicts have arisen due to imbalances in ability, country, and resources between ethnic groups. Additionally, the commission has focused on educating the country about the history of violence, and emphasises promoting reconciliation through revealing of truth.

The public is invited and encouraged to participate to fulfill the goal of educating the public. Members of the public may attend the public hearings, and can volunteer to assist the TJRC in fulfilling its mandate. They may likewise brand submissions to the commission regarding the TJRC mandate. Victims may apply for reparations if they qualify.

Objectives [edit]

In its work the Commission volition pursue the following goals and objectives:

  • Truth: by establishing an accurate, consummate and historical record of homo rights violations and historical injustices, and educating the public
  • Justice: Criminal justice, restorative justice, social justice through recommendations for prosecution, amnesty, reparations
  • Peace and National Unity
  • Healing and Reconciliation (national and individual)
  • Restoration of the human being nobility of victims and perpetrators.

Specific objectives for investigating human rights abuses:

  • To establish an authentic, consummate and historical tape of violations and abuses of human rights, committed betwixt 12 Dec 1963 and 28 February 2008, such as:
  • Abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, murder, massacres, extrajudicial killings, crimes of sexual nature against female victims and expropriation of property suffered by any person.
  • To investigate the gross violations of international human rights police and make up one's mind those responsible for their commission.
  • To investigate and provide redress of crimes of sexual nature against female person victims.
  • To investigate the context, causes and circumstances nether which the gross violations of human rights occurred.
  • To identify actors who purported to take acted on behalf of whatever public torso responsible for the gross violations of human rights, and persons who should be prosecuted for existence responsible.
  • To identify and specify the victims of the gross violations of human rights and their whereabouts.
  • To facilitate the granting of provisional amnesty to persons who brand full disclosure of all the relevant facts, relating to the gross violations of human rights and economic crimes, and who comply with the requirements of the TJRC Human activity.

Specific Objectives for Investigating Economic/Public Land Crimes

  • To investigate economic crimes including thousand corruption and the exploitation of natural resources and the activity taken, if any.
  • To inquire into the irregular and illegal allocation of public land, in terms of repossession or determination of cases.
  • To ask into and establish the reality or otherwise of perceived economic marginalisation of communities.
  • To inquire into misuse of public institutions for political objectives.
  • To educate and engage the public and give sufficient publicity to the work of the Commission.

Specific objectives for the recommendation process

Make Recommendations in Response to Human Rights Abuses in Terms of:

  • Reparation and rehabilitation policy or measures aimed at granting reparations and restoring the ceremonious and human dignity of the victims.
  • Prevention of violations and abuses of human rights through institutional, administrative and legislative measures.
  • Granting of conditional immunity to persons who brand total disclosure.
  • Prosecution of perpetrators or persons involved.
  • Promotion of healing, reconciliation and coexistence amongst indigenous communities.

Make recommendations equally to:

  • The reforms and other measures needed to accomplish the object of the Commission, and accost any specific concern and actions to exist taken.
  • A mechanism or framework and an institutional arrangement in that connection, for the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission.
  • The implementation of the reports of the relevant commissions of inquiry.
  • Repossession or conclusion of cases relating to public land caused through irregular and illegal allocation.
  • Addressing the real or perceived economic marginalisation of communities.

For information visit TJRC Kenya website.[15]

The Commissioners [edit]

The commissioners of the TJRC are both local and international, and there has been controversy regarding the legitimacy of the committee due to its commissioners. Some of the commissioners and people involved with the commission were involved with the previous regime, and, consequently, people question the impartiality of the commission. Nevertheless, the commissioners offering different types of expertise that they tin apply to Republic of kenya'south TJRC.

  • Bethuel Kiplagat was the chairman of the commission. Originally, President Mwai Kibaki picked him to caput the commission. However, Kiplagat afterward stepped down in November 2010 after being pressured to resign past fellow commissioners, civil social club groups, human rights activists and the general public since he was part of a coming together of the Kenyan Intelligence Commission held less than forty viii hours prior to the security operation that resulted in the Wagalla massacre, which according to the United nations was the worst massacre in Kenya's history. The TJRC investigated the massacre and made a finding that Kiplagat should be barred from further public offices and investigated for possible complicity in the massacre. Information technology is the first time a truth commission has made a negative finding concerning its own Chairman. In add-on to the Wagalla Massacre, the Commission investigated two additional violations to which Kiplagat was linked: the murder of Republic of kenya's Strange Government minister, Robert Ouko (politician); Kiplagat was also accused of country grabbing while he acted equally Permanent Secretary during former President Moi's authorities. In April 2012, Kiplagat was reinstated as TJRC chairman after the Justice Minister Eugene Wamalwa brokered a truce between him and the other commissioners.[16] Previously, Kiplagat worked with the National Christian Council of Kenya, served as an Ambassador to French republic, the High Commissioner to UK, and the Permanent Secretarial assistant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kiplagat was as well the chair of the lath of the African Medical and Research Foundation and worked with Kenya's Special Envoy to the Somalia peace process.[17]
  • Tecla Namachanja Wanjala acted every bit the chairperson in Kiplagat's absence, and she has been involved in peacemaking in Kenya during the 1991–92 and 1997 violence. She has participated in several different countries' conflict resolution processes, including Sudan, Rwanda and Federal democratic republic of ethiopia, and she headed the Regional Party for Peace in East and Cardinal Africa Programme, which seeks to increment African leadership in conflict management in the Horn of Africa. She trained 500 workers for the Nairobi Peace Initiative, consulted for Japan International Cooperation Agency, and journeyed with internally displaced persons in Kenya during the ethnic clashes of 1993–1995. She organised aid for over xl,000 survivors of the violence. She is from Kenya.
  • Ahmed Sheikh Farah, a commissioner from Kenya, has worked internationally for the Republic of kenya Armed Forces. He has experience in disharmonize prevention, management, and resolutions at both the regional and international levels.
  • Berhanu Dinka, a commissioner from Ethiopia, has 27 years of experience working in the Ethiopian Strange Service and in the United Nations. He as well acted as an Ethiopian ambassador and headed the Department of Africa and Middle Eastward Affairs in the Ministry building of Foreign Affairs. After attaining the rank of Under Secretary-General in the UN, Commissioner Dinka represented the Secretarial assistant General during negotiations to resolve the conflict in DR Congo.
  • Gertrude Chawatama, a commissioner from Zambia, has over xix years of professional judicial feel. She is a gauge with the High Court of Zambia, a board member of the Commonwealth Judicial Educational activity Plant based in Canada, a quango member of the Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association for the Eastward, Central and Southern African region, and chairperson of the Juvenile Justice Forum in Zambia.
  • Margaret Shava, a commissioner from Republic of kenya, has worked in law, management, and peace-edifice for over 17 years. She is an advocate of the High Court of Republic of kenya and has practised law with a leading law firm in Nairobi. Commissioner Shava has experience in the economical sectors, modern corporate and human resources management, and the United nations. She likewise worked with national and international NGOs that specialise in human rights, governance, and international refugee law.
  • Ronald Slye, a commissioner from the United States, is a professor of law at the Seattle University School of Law. He consults, writes, and teaches on public international police force and international human rights law, and is a specialist in international criminal police and transitional justice. Commissioner Slye is the author of manufactures on international law, human rights, and environmental and poverty police, and he is the co-author of two books on international criminal law. He is writing a book on the Due south African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its amnesty process, based on his time equally one of the commission'due south legal consultants. He has published a book near his experience with the Kenyan Truth Commission: "The Kenyan TJRC: An Outsider's View from the Inside," published by Cambridge Academy Press. A companion website established at his University makes available the Commission's Terminal Report, the dissent filed past the international Commissioners, and transcripts of many of the public hearings held by the Committee. The website is: https://digitalcommons.constabulary.seattleu.edu/tjrc/.
  • Tom Ojienda, a commissioner from Republic of kenya, is a former president of the Eastward African Law Society, former chair of the Law Society of Kenya, and financial secretary and vice-president of the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU). He was a consultant for the Njonjo and Ndungu State Commissions, Globe Bank, USAID, Accordance and EAC, and served as a member of the Legal and Technical Working Group in the National Land Policy formulation process. Commissioner Ojienda has written two books on state law and edited ii books on democracy and ramble change.[18]

Departments [edit]

The work of the TJRC is being accomplished through the work of seven dissimilar departments.

  • The department of Finance & Administration provides support to the commission by organising the logistical and administrative aspects of the committee's upkeep and finances.[19]
  • The department of Communications acts every bit the link betwixt the committee and the public. Information technology provides information to the media and ensures that the Kenyan population has access to the commission'due south proceedings. The department of Communications maintains clarity in regard to the committee'southward mandate and processes, encourages the public, particularly those who have suffered from gross homo rights violations, to participate in the commission, and facilitates national discourse.[twenty]
  • The Special Support Services Unit of measurement works with the specific experiences of vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and people with disabilities. Information technology considers gender-based violations, ensures that witnesses can communicate in their chosen language, and focuses on the treatment of witness and their families.[21]
  • The department of Legal Affairs manages all of the committee'due south legal issues. It gives legal support and advice, organises the hearings, and provides back up to the victims and witnesses in conjunction with the Special Services Unit.[22]
  • The department of Investigations collects, analyses, and provides the necessary show and data for the commission to run smoothly. Information technology enables the commission to construct a complete historical record by interviewing and collecting evidence from victims and witnesses of the gross human rights violations and mapping out scenes of violence for the committee's site visits.[23]
  • The department of Research conducts research relating to the committee'due south mandate, assists the inquiry of other units within the committee, and coordinates the writing of the commission'due south final report.[24]
  • The Civic Education and Outreach Unit educates and engages the public in the workings of the committee.[25]

Activities of the Commission [edit]

The Commission volition undertake the following activities to fulfill its mandate;

Statement taking [edit]

Statements recorded from victims across the land are the main source of information for the TJRC on gross human rights violations suffered past them during the mandate period (12 December 1963 and 28 Feb 2008). The statement taking procedure provides victims with the opportunity to tell the truth well-nigh their experiences and those of close friends and relatives.

Hearings [edit]

The TJRC volition conduct public and individual hearings at which victims, perpetrators, experts will give testimony relating to gross violations of human rights.

Private hearings

Individual hearings will focus on private cases, and the feel of individuals with respect to violations within the mandate of the Commission.

Thematic and event hearings

Thematic hearings will focus on types of violations and other wide themes within the mandate of the Commission.

Institutional Hearings

Institutional hearings will focus on the part played by an institution or institutions with respect to violations within the mandate of the Commission

[edit]

The TJRC will hold discussion forums bringing together different groups across the country (ethnic; religious; chiefs; women; youth) to chart ways of establishing reconciliation, harmonious co-existence and national unity. This aspect of the TJRC'due south work presents avenues for collaboration with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), and other Agenda Four Commissions.

The final study [edit]

This is the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission'southward main production. It will document the Commission'due south work relating to the post-obit aspects:

  • Consist of historical tape of gross homo rights violations
  • Outline the Committee's findings and detail recommendations on: how to address past violations and injustices through reparations and prosecutions; How to forestall time to come violations in various ways including specific legal and institutional reforms and memorialisation.

Timeline: The Commission began in August 2009 with an operational period of ii years. This period includes three months prior to beginning operations for prepare, and three months following as a "winding down" period. The Commission requested a 6-month extension, thus the current timeline is equally follows:

  • Start of set upwardly catamenia: iii August 2009
  • Start of operational menstruation: 3 November 2009
  • End of operational period and issuing of report: 3 November 2011
  • End of winding downwardly menses: 3 February 2012


A full copy of the Terminal Report, including the dissent submitted by the international Commissioners, can be institute at https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc/.

The TJRC and the International Criminal Court [edit]

The International Criminal Court (ICC) became involved in Kenya when Kenya ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on xv March 2005, which gave the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes confronting humanity, and genocide committed in Republic of kenya after the statute came into forcefulness, or July 2002. The ICC has jurisdiction but when the land in question fails to deed on crimes against humanity that were perpetrated on its land. The Kenyan government created the Committee of Inquiry on Mail Election Violence (CIPEV), otherwise known as the Waki Committee, in February 2008, which was an international commission of research with the aim of investigating the post-ballot violence that occurred in Kenya. One of the many suggestions in the official report that the Waki Commission made was that the Kenyan regime establish a tribunal of both international and national judges to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of the gross human rights violations. The committee gave the regime a limited amount of time to agree to create a special tribunal, and made it clear that the commission would give its findings to the ICC if the government failed to institute the tribunal within the given timeframe.[26] In February 2009, after the Kenyan Parliament voted against founding the tribunal and no further activeness was taken by the authorities, the Waki Committee handed over its information, including a listing of those believed to be responsible for the violence, to the ICC. On 26 November 2009, the Prosecutor requested permission from the court to investigate the crimes against humanity during the post-election violence in Kenya, and was granted permission to practise so by the majority of the court. Afterwards conveying out investigations against six prominent individuals believed to exist responsible for the crimes against humanity, the International Criminal Courtroom investigation in Kenya decided to ship four of them to trial. The government has protested the findings. It asked the UN to postpone the ICC's Kenya instance, and has put upwardly substantial resistance to the ICC.[27] In add-on, confidence in Republic of kenya's judiciary has declined, and, as part of the National Accord made later on the 2008 violence, the government has responded by launching an investigation into the judiciary. Four senior judges, Justice Samuel Bosire, Justice Joseph Gregory Nyamu, Justice Samuel Cornelius Riaga Omolo, and Justice Emmanuel Okelo O'Kubasu, were declared unfit for office by the investigation in April 2012. The 2 senior Courtroom of Appeals judges, Justice Bosire and Justice Nyamu, were removed from role considering of their involvement with the Goldenberg scandal trials. It is expected that more judges will be removed from part as the investigation continues. This ruling marks the beginning of the second phase of the vetting process, and the investigation may finish the corruption in Kenya's ain legal system. [28]

Criticism and media coverage [edit]

The relative immaturity of Kenya's TJRC makes information technology difficult to evaluate the commission's success. This immaturity still also secures a great wealth of contempo give-and-take on the TJRC and many opinions regarding its success. For case, the vice-president of the International Eye for Transitional Justice recently spoke of the International Criminal Court'due south interest in the efforts to reconcile Republic of kenya. He commented that, "This week's conclusion in The Hague [confirming four Kenyans must reply to charges of crimes against humanity] was welcomed peacefully across the country. Information technology is telling that most Kenyans support the ICC and take little faith in their ain judiciary, which is widely perceived equally corrupt." He chosen the Kenyan government to fulfill their responsibility to pursue justice at dwelling house to avoid violence after the anticipated 2012 ballot. Like criticism came from the Us earlier Hillary Clinton's visit in August 2009. Specifically the US criticised the use of local courts to try suspects defendant of perpetrating violence. These courts, the United states of america argued, had a backlog of hundreds of thousands of cases and a reputation for corruption. Critics also question the credibility of the commissioners because of their connection to Moi's regime and its gross human rights violations. Deputy chair of the committee, lawyer Betty Murungi, resigned saying that she found it difficult to fulfill her duties when the commission leader, Bethwell Kiplagat, faced accusations. Additionally, the inability of the commission to meet its eleven November 2011 written report deadline only enhanced public scepticism. The task of reconciling the people of Kenya after the series of gross human rights violations that have occurred of the past one-half-century requires a stable commission and a authorities that the people of Republic of kenya can believe in.[29] [30] [31]

References [edit]

  1. ^ Post Election Violence in Republic of kenya. Dialogue Kenya
  2. ^ Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project. south.co.ke
  3. ^ a b Jeffrey Gettleman (31 January 2008) "Official Sees kenyan Ethnic Cleansing". The New York Times
  4. ^ T. Craig Spud, "A Comparative Assay of Violence in Republic of kenya", University of Denver Portfolio.
  5. ^ "Kenya: Indigenous fighting between Kikuyu and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley (1998–1999)," The United nations Refugee Agency, three August 1999.
  6. ^ a b doc.pdf "On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya'south Mail-2007 Election Violence" [ dead link ] . Republic of kenya National Commission on Human Rights, xv August 2008.
  7. ^ Daily Nation, 11 March 1998.
  8. ^ Border Kanyongolo (December 1998) "Republic of kenya: Post-election political violence". Article 19.
  9. ^ Kimani Kjogu, Healing the Wound: Personal Narrative About the 2007 Post-Election Violence (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 2009).
  10. ^ "Republic of kenya rivals agree to share power". BBC News. 28 February 2008. Archived from the original on 29 Feb 2008. Retrieved one March 2008
  11. ^ Wangui Kanina (18 September 2008) "Kenya'southward ballot seen as badly flawed". Reuters.
  12. ^ "Police kill unarmed civilian". KTN. 16 January 2008. Retrieved 2008-07-11. (AFP) – 26 January 2008 (26 January 2008). "AFP: Politician's portrait marks border in Kenyan slum". Afp.google.com. Retrieved 2010-05-01.
  13. ^ "Republic of kenya unveils 40-seat cabinet", Al Jazeera, 13 April 2008.
  14. ^ "Odinga sworn in as Kenya PM", Al Jazeera, 17 April 2008.
  15. ^ http://world wide web.tjrckenya.org Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya
  16. ^ Lordrick Mayabi (11 Apr 2012) Kiplagat, TJRC foes call a truce. capitalfm.co.ke
  17. ^ Bethuel Kiplagat. africa-confidential.com
  18. ^ The Commissioners. tjrckenya.org
  19. ^ Finance and Administration Unit of measurement. tjrckenya.org
  20. ^ Communications Unit. tjrckenya.org
  21. ^ Special Support Services Unit. tjrckenya.org
  22. ^ Legal Affairs Unit of measurement. tjrckenya.org
  23. ^ Investigations Unit. tjrckenya.org
  24. ^ Enquiry Unit. tjrckenya.org
  25. ^ Civic Education and Outreach Unit. tjrckenya.org
  26. ^ "The Waki Commission Written report". AfricaFiles, 15 October 2008.
  27. ^ Kevin J. Kelley (nineteen March 2011) "Why Kenya failed to defer ICC cases at Security Quango". Daily Nation.
  28. ^ Wahome Thuku and Isaiah Lucheli (26 April 2012) "Scandals and past rulings end careers of four senior judges". The Standard
  29. ^ Paul Seils (2012) "ICC'south Republic of kenya decision is no cause for celebration". International Center of Transitional Justice
  30. ^ Tom Maliti (iv Baronial 2009) "US criticizes Kenya ahead of Clinton's visit". Hillary Clinton Lodge
  31. ^ Adow Mohamed (27 April 2011) list_messages/38270 "KENYA: Truth Commission's capacity questioned", AfricaNews.

External links [edit]

  • Disharmonize Assay of the 2007 Post Ballot Violence in Kenya by Mary J Roberts
  • Truth Commission: Kenya by Usa Constitute of Peace
  • A full copy of the TJRC Final Report, including the dissent past the three international commissioners, may be found at: http://digitalcommons.constabulary.seattleu.edu/tjrc/
  • Archived versions of the TJRC official website, via Human Rights Web Archive

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Truth,_Justice_and_Reconciliation_Commission_of_Kenya

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